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"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a scornful
tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more
nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make the
words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is the
master-that's all."
-LEwis CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass.
N recent years the concept of independent contractorship has been
invoked in an infinite variety of fact situations under many federal
and state statutes and in connection with innumerable non-
statutory causes of action. Characteristically, such situations have
dealt with public and private rights and duties arising out of the rela-
tionships between employers and employees or between either or both
of them and third parties. In most instances, there have been concerted
efforts by affected employers to exclude any person classifiable as an
independent contractor from the operation of the particular law in-
volved in the case. The independent contractor has thus become a
kind of legal orphan in the field of modem labor law. This problem
of the status of the independent contractor under modem social and
labor legislation is no mere matter of abstract speculation. Even a
cursory reference to current administrative and judicial decisions re-
veals that the question of "inclusion" or "exclusion" affects hundreds
of thousands of persons performing services in many different in-
dustries.
The complexity of the problem is seen in better perspective when it
is realized that, currently, there are no less than seventy-five federal
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and state statutes under which it is primarily necessary to ascertain
whether an affected person is an employee or an independent con-
tractor. The list of such federal laws and typical state statutes dealing
with many varieties of social and labor problems is set forth in the
footnote.1
1 FFederal Statutes
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. S 201
(1947).
Social Security Act: 49 Stat. 620 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 301 (1952).
Wash-Healey Act: 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 616 (1950), 41
U.S.C.A. § 35 (1952).
Davis-Bacon Act: 46 Stat. 1494 (1931), 40 U.S.C.A. S 276a (1952).
Internal Revenue Code: withholding tax provisions, 52 Stat. 508 (1938), as amended,
26 U.S.C.A. § 143 (1945), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1621-27 (1948).
Sherman Anti-Trust Act: 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1951).
Clayton Anti-Trust Act: 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 (1951).
National Labor Relations Act: 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. S 151
(1947).
Norris-LaGuardia Act: 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1947).
Employers' Liability Acts: railroads, 34 Stat. 232 (1906), 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (1943).
Arbitration: generally, 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1942).
Holidays: government employees, 5 U.S.C.A. S 86 (1950), 26 U.S.C.A. § 1622 (1948).
Alien Contract Labor Laws: 23 Stat. 332 (1885), 8 U.S.C.A. § 141 (1942).
Anti-Racketeering Act: 48 Stat. 979 (1934), 18 U.S.C.A. S 1951 (1951).
Lea Act: radio-coercive practices, 60 Stat. 89 (1946), 47 U.S.C.A. § 506 (1953).
Railway Labor Act: 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1943).
Byrnes Act: transporting strike-breakers, 49 Stat. 1899 (1936), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1231
(1950).
Farm Labor Supply Appropriation Act: Wet-Back Law, 57 Star. 11 (1944), 50 U.S.C.
App. § 1351 (1951).
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940:54 Stat. 885, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 301 (1951).
National Guard Mobilization Act of 1940: 54 Star. 858, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 401 (1951).
Reemployment of Merchant Marine Members: 57 Stat. 162 (1943), 50 U.S.C.A. App.
§ 1471 (1951).
Service Extension Act of 1941: 55 Stat. 626, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 303 (1951).
Womens Army Corps Act: 57 Stat. 371 (1943), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 1551 (1951).
Universal Military Training and Service Act: 65 Star. 75 (1951), 50 U.S.C.A. App.
§451 (Supp., 1952).
Illinois Statutes
Unemployment Compensation Act: I11. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 48, §§ 300-820: "Em-
ployer," § 315; "Employment," § 316.
Workmens Compensation Act: I1l. Rev. Star. (1951), c. 48, § 138.1-138.28: "Employer,"
§ 138.1 (a); "Employee," § 138.1(b).
Definitions of "Employee" can also be found: Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 24, § 1009; c. 24 ,
§ 153; c. 127, § 217; c. 144, S 83.
Maximum Hours Act: I11. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 48:
Limitations on hours of labor of females, § 5;
Hours of work, Child Labor Laws, § 31.3.
Minimum Wage Laws: Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 48:
Minimum wage standards for women and minors, §§ 198.1-216(d).
Employment Agency Laws: Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 48:
Employment Offices and Agencies, § 172 (a)-(c);
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BASIS FOR EXCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
As above noted, it has become customary to exclude independent
contractors from the Operation of these statutes. This practice of ex-
clusion which has now become universal is apparently premised on the
assumption that an independent contractor plays an entrepreneurial role
in our economic society and that he must be kept in a separate cate-
gory beyond the reach of federal and state regulations affecting the
employer-employee relationship. Even the socio-legal architects of the
New Deal accepted this principle and refused to assimilate the inde-
pendent contractor to the employee as a person to whom the protec-
tive provisions of the New Deal legislation should apply. This univer-
sal exclusionary practice has not been criticized or contested by any
recognized legal or economic authority. There is obvious agreementthat in any context, federal and state laws applicable to employees
should not be applicable to self-employed entrepreneurs or similarly
Public Employment Offices and Agencies, §§ 173-186;
Private Employment Agencies, § 197 (a)-(o).
Voting Time Laws: 111. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 46, §§ 7-12, 17-15.
Not-For-Profit Corporation Laws: Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 32:
Corporations not for pecuniary profit, § 163 (a)-(al0 0);
Religious Corporations, §§ 164-187.
Boycott, Blacklist: Conspiracy to establish, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 38, § 139.
Criminal Statutes: Secondary Boycott and Extortion, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 38,
§§ 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246.
Yellow Dog Contract Laws: Prohibited, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 48, 2 (b).
Arbitration Laws: Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 10.
Health and Safety Act: Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 48, § 137.1-137.21.
One Day Rest In Seven Law: Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 48, § 8(a)-(h).
Holidays: ill. Rev. Star. (1951), c. 98, §§ 18-20(b).
Payment of Wages Due Employees: II. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 48, §§ 32-39(m).
Convict Labor Acts: Penitentiaries, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 108:
Requesting employment of convicts and disposition of their products, §§ 74-102;
Convict labor on public roads, §§ 103-104.
Wage Assignment Laws: Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 48, §§ 39.1-40.
Garnishment Laws: ill. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 62.
Union Label Laws: See "Trademarks," Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 140.
Legal Aid Laws: See ll. Rev. Star. (1951), c. 38, § 730-730(a); c. 33, § 5.
Other States
For compilation of statutory enactments concerning labor relations, conciliation and
mediation, and artibration, see Prentice-Hall, Labor Service, Vol. 3. For example, see
references therein to various state acts affecting employer-employee relations not
hereinabove designated, particularly, various state labor relations acts. For similar
compilations also see other loose leaf labor publications, such as, CCH Labor Law Re-
porter and Bureau of National Affairs Labor Law Reporter.
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classified individuals who earn their livelihood as independent busi-
nessmen of one kind or another. The latter are clearly outside the
societal groups to which these federal and state enactments were in-
tended to be applied. 2
Of course, in effectuating these exclusions, there has been the wide-
spread assumption that an independent contractor is clearly identi-
fiable and that his status in our jurisprudence is readily distinguishable
from that of an employee. Thus, the Committee on Education and
Labor of the House of Representatives in submitting its Report on
H.R. 3020, Labor-Management Relations Act (1947), could be quite
positive that
An 'employee' according to all standard dictionaries, according to the law as
the courts have stated it, and according to the understanding of almost every-
one ... means someone who works for another for hire .... In the law, there
always has been a difference, and a big difference, between 'employees' and
'independent contractors.' 'Employees' work for wages or salary under direct
supervision. 'Independent contractors' undertake to do a job for a price, decide
how the work will be done, usually hire others to do the work, and depend for
their income not upon wages, but upon the difference of what they pay for
goods, materials, and labor and what they receive for the end results, that is,
upon profits.8
Accordingly, the House proposed the provision later included in
Section 2 (3) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, as amended,
that "The term employee shall include any employee ... but shall not
include any individual having the status of an independent contrac-
tor."4 Subsequently, the House Conference Committee reaffirmed this
point of view.5
The amendment as proposed in the House version was ultimately
adopted. Significantly, Congress did not enact any legislative defini-
tion of the term "employee" or "independent contractor."
The same terms in other federal statutes were also left undefined.
In the Fair Labor Standards Act, Congress described an employee as
any individual employed by an employer;" nor did the Social Security
2 United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 718 (1947); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,
322 U.S. 111 (1944).
3 NLRB, 1 Legislative History of Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, at 309
(1948).
4 Ibid., at 35.
5 Ibid., at 536.
660 Stat. 1095 (1946), 29 U.S.C.A. § 203 (E) (1947).
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Act define any distinction between an employee and an independent
contractor.
7
Unfortunately, the problem of identifying the independent con-
tractor in our industrial society is not a simple mechanical problem.
The congressional assumption that there is always available some
"simple, uniform and easily applicable test ... to determine whether
persons doing work for others fall in one class or the other"' is simply
not true.
CURRENT CHAOS IN CASE LAW
There are literally thousands of decisions issued by American and
English courts revealing an infinite number of varying and inconsistent
applications of the tests designed to determine whether or not an
individual is an employee. There have been few legislative concepts
which have been applied more varyingly or inconsistently. As Justice
Rutledge stated,
Few problems in the law have given greater variety of application and con-
flict in result than the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly
an employer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of independently
entrepreneurial dealing.... It is enough to point out that, with reference to an
identical problem, results may be contrary over a very considerable region of
doubt in applying the distinction depending upon the state or jurisdiction
where the determination is made, and that within a single jurisdiction a per-
7 49 Stat. (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 301 (1952). The congressional state of
mind which motivated the amendment in the Taft-Hartley Act also subsequently
motivated amendment to the Social Security Act by the so-called Gearhart Reso-
lution, 80th Cong. (Pub. L. No. 642, June 14, 1948), 62 Stat. 438. That Resolution
designed to preserve the "status quo," provided that the term "employee" in the
Social Security Act should not include (1) any individual who under the usual com-
mon law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship has the
status of an independent contractor, and (2) any individual (except an officer of a
corporation) who is an employee under such common law rules.
8NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). In various state Unem-
loyment Compensation Acts statutory definitions commonly known as "ABC" tests
ave been inserted. These tests were designed to establish when services performed
are deemed to be employment. In general, services are deemed to be employment
unless they are free from control or direction, are performed outside the "employer's"
usual course of business, and are performed by an individual customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation or business. However, there has been a
marked tendency to subordinate the independent calling test to the control test. Many
courts have failed to fully apply all of the statutory tests. In fact, many courts have
regarded the three-test provision in a perfunctory manner: e.g., Singer Sewing Machine
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 175, 134 P. 2d 479 (1943); Moorman Mfg. Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 241 Wis. 200, 5 N.W. 2d 743 (1942). See cases cited, Teple,
The Employer-Employee Relationship, 10 Qhio St. L. J. 153 (1949).
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son who for instance, is held to be an 'independent contractor' for the pur-
pose of imposing vicarious liability in tort may be an 'employee' for the pur-
poses of particular legislation, such as unemployment compensation. See, e.g.,
Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 98 Utah 36. In short, the
assumed simplicity and uniformity, resulting from application of 'common-
law standards,' does not exist.9
In view of the utterly indescribable confusion in this field of the
law, the doctrinaire assertions of the congressional lawmakers 10 appear
to be inexplicable. Many competent legal scholars have graphically
dealt with this problem. Many law review articles have fully con-
sidered the complete failure of the various "common law" tests to
establish any degree of uniformity in the decided cases.1'
This point has been so well established that the citation of individual
cases hardly seems necessary. In the federal cases many groups per-
forming services of one kind or another have been classified as em-
ployees and independent contractors despite the similarity of their
respective working patterns in the contradictory cases. This has been
true of miners, lumbermen, trappers, fishermen, newsboys, laundry
drivers, bakery drivers, milkwagon drivers, salesmen, filling station
operators, truck drivers, taxicab drivers, entertainers and many others.
In the state cases the contradictory rulings with reference to identical
work patterns are far more numerous, simply because there are far
more cases. Even the Fuller Brush man has been variously classified as
an employee and an independent contractor. This is one of the more
incredible instances in view of the minute regulation to which these
salesmen are subjected in the various subdivided regions throughout
the country.
ANALYSIS OF CURRENT TESTS: RIGHT OF CONTROL
In the Restatement of The Law of Agency, published in 1933, an
attempt was made to codify the definitive elements of employment in
connection with the determination of liability in tort actions. Signif-
icantly, however, the control test was given primary consideration,
9 322 U.S. 111, 120 (1944).
10 NLRB, Legislative History of Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, op. cit.
supra notes 3, 4, 5.
11 See, e.g., Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 188
(1939); Leidy, Salesmen as Independent Contractors, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 365 (1938);
Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 501 (1935);
N.Y. Law Revision Commission Report, Legislative Document No. 65 (K) (1939).
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although nine separate factors were listed as pertinent elements.
Subsequent experience showed that the approach provided by the
Restatement was misguided. The multiplicity of criteria provided
merely afforded an opportunity to rationalize judicial preconceptions
in the fact situations presented for adjudication.
Court and agency decisions constitute a "patchwork quilt" of con-
flicting and confusing conclusions. These conclusions, reached in a
myriad of decisions, have not resulted from the application of a single
"common law" control test. The Restatement lists nine separate ele-
ments, which, theoretically, were designed to comprise an amalgam of
criteria on which uniform determinations could be predicated. In prac-
tice, however, judges, boards and trial examiners, with a fine unction,
have stressed each of those elements, separately, in different decisions,
at different times, in connection with practically identical fact pat-
terns, yielding utterly irreconcilable adjudications. Although most of
the decisions pay lip service to the control test as though it were a
sacred incantation, the science of legal semantics has proven sufficient-
ly resourceful to provide the necessary "formulae of evasion." An
illustrative situation is provided in Matter of Steinberg and Co., 78
N.L.R.B. 211 (1948), where the Board found that fur trappers were
employees within the meaning of the amended Act. Subsequently,
however, enforcement was denied in a decision which reversed the
Board's findings.13
The Board found that the fur trappers subleased land on which they
conducted trapping operations during annual seasons lasting approxi-
mately seventy-five days. The land was leased by the Company under
12 § 220. The nine elements were as follows:
(1) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over
the details of the work;
(2) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(3) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work
is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
(4) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(5) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools,
and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(6) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(7) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(8) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; and
(9) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of master
and servant.
13 NLRB v. Steinberg, 182 F. 2d 850 (C.A. 5th, 1950).
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contracts which required the trappers to devote their time completely
and exclusively to the Company's work during the season. They were
prohibited from leaving the premises at any time during the season,
without Company permission. At an earlier time the Company frank-
ly acknowledged their status as employees. Their work was steady
during successive seasons and their tenure was regarded as permanent.
The Company retained title to all muskrats caught by them. The
amount of the trappers' earnings was controlled by the Company's
exclusive determination of fur grades. The Company retained absolute
power of checking, inspection and final termination of services. The
Board specifically referred to the "ordinary tests of the law of agency"
which it acknowledged were made applicable by the House Commit-
tee Report heretofore discussed. However, after referring to the
"familiar right-of-control test," the Board invoked the omnibus theory
of the Restatement.14 All pertinent factors, however, were subordi-
nated to the principal finding that the work performed by the trap-
pers constituted an integral portion of the operations carried on by
the Company. Among the various countervailing factors which the
Board found "relatively unimportant," the Board noted that earnings
depended upon the number of furs obtained by the trappers; that the
trappers were assisted by wives and children; that no taxes, such as
Social Security or Unemployment Insurance, were collected; and that
the trappers, like many skilled employees, furnished their own tools of
the trade, such as boats and equipment. Although the Board stressed
the fact that the trappers engaged in activities which constituted an
integral part of the Company's business,'" it has utterly failed to invoke
this test in other cases where it has found that individuals performing
services were independent contractors.'
The Court of Appeals found that the above incidents did not con-
stitute an employer-employee relationship. Derogating the conclusion
that the trappers were engaged in an integral part of the Company's
business, the Court made its determination on the basis of its conclu-
sion that there was no control exercised over the manner of rendition
of service. The Court admitted that there was some control, but ra-
tionalized it thuswise:
14 "The character of the relationship is to be appraised by the presence or absence
of no single evidentiary factor but by an over-all view." 78 N.L.R.B. 211, 221 (1948).
15 Ibid., at 222. In the omnibus approach, performance of "integrated" work is treated
as one of the indicia of the "right-of-control" principle.
16 See discussion concerning truck drivers, in later paragraphs.
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An employer has a right to exercise such control over an independent con-
tractor as is necessary to secure the performance of the contract according to
its terms in order to accomplish the results contemplated by the parties in mak-
ing the contract without thereby creating such contractor an employee.' 7
Thus, the Court emphasized the absence of supervisory control over
the conduct of daily activities, completely ignoring the crucial fact
that such supervision was rendered unnecessary because of the herit-
age and experience of the trappers. On the other hand, the Court com-
pletely derogated the more effective fundamental control exercised
by the Company in such a manner as to destroy any vestige of inde-
pendent entrepreneurial enterprise. This kind of actual control was
literally brushed off as an example of the kind of control as to the
end result rather than an exercise of control over the detail of the
work. Moreover, the Court ignored the Board's basic (although not ex-
pressed) conclusion that the trappers were actually carrying on the
functional operations of the Company's business, rather than any sepa-
rate independent business owned by them. It is submitted that it is
legal mumbo-jumbo of this kind which has created chaos in this field
of law and which has resulted too frequently in judicial evasion of
congressional purpose.
The inadequacy of the control test is particularly noticeable in cases
such as the Steinberg case (supra) where an individual employee is
highly skilled and because of his training and experience requires no
supervision. Indeed, there are innumerable work situations where the
nature of the job makes the exercise of control over the manner of
rendition inexpedient or unnecessary, or impossible. Typical examples
are to be found in various ambulatory jobs, such as truck hauling,
selling and vending, etc. In the motor carrier cases, which will be dis-
cussed in later paragraphs, the skill and the very nature of the drivers'
work permits an absence of direct supervision over the manner of ren-
dition of their service. On the other hand, the regulations of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission and the fact that their services constitute
the very essence of the company's operations require a fundamental
degree of control which utterly negates any "independent" aspect of
their relationship to the company. To ignore the latter and to empha-
size the former characteristic, as the National Labor Relations Board
and the courts have frequently done, constitutes a flagrant perversion
of characterization. It should be universally agreed that mere absence
of control in such instances does not mean that such so-called "free
17 182 F. 2d 850, 856 (C.A. 5th, 1950).
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wheeling" activities constitute independent contractorship.'8 In a true
common law test (to be subsequently considered), it will be recog-
nized that where the very nature of the relationship negates an inde-
pendent contractorship, a false characterization by mere partisan
nomenclature can be eliminated in the process of adjudication.
THE PROBLEM OF EVASION
In fact it must be admitted that the control test encourages efforts
to defeat the obvious purposes of such "social duty" statutes as the
National Labor Relations Act, 9 and other statutes enacted during the
New Deal period. After the passage of New Deal legislation, some em-
ployers sought to escape the statutory duties imposed upon employers
by setting up artificial independent contractorship arrangements. A
pertinent example has been noted in the Steinberg fur trappers case
where, prior to 1934, the Company recognized and dealt with the
trappers as employees. It would appear as more than mere coincidence
that after the "100 days" of New Deal legislative action, the Com-
pany suddenly "discontinued the use of employment contracts and
adopted the lease or sublease forms" 20 under which it later contended
that the trappers were "independent" businessmen. The benefits to
such employers were manifold. By such conversion employers sought
to obviate any statutory obligations under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, under the Social Security, Unemployment Compensation,
and Fair Labor Standards Acts, and, in addition, many of the other
federal and state laws enumerated above.2' Indeed, in a nationally
advertised and distributed tax service, the publishers issued a special
18 In United States v. Vogue, Inc., 145 F. 2d 609, 611 (C.A. 4th, 1944), the Court, in
finding that seamstresses were employees within the meaning of the Social Security
Act, observed:
"The law of independent contractors has an important place in the law, but surely
it was never intended to apply to humble employees of this sort so completely sub-
ject to the domination and control of the employer. To allow an employer to escape
the consequences or to deny the employee benefits of the employer-employee re-
lationship because of agreement that payment is to be made on the piece work basis
or because the employee exercises the judgment with respect to the work that is
expected of any skilled worker is to lose the substance of the relationship in attempt-
ing to apply certain rule of thumb distinctions in the law of independent contractors.
The fact that one having an independent calling, such as cook, gardener or chauf-
feur, exercises a judgment as to the work done free of detailed direction by his em-
ployer does not make him an independent contractor. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
See also Rest., Agency S 220, Comment e on subsection (2) (1933).
19 NLRB, I Legislative History of Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, at 35
(1948).
20 78 N.L.R.B. 211, 223 (1948). 21 Authorities cited note I supra.
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brochure to their clients. In it, suggestions were made concerning
considerable tax savings to be effectuated by subtracting sufficient
control in given situations, thereby converting an employment rela-
tionship into an independent contractorship. Illustrations were pro-
vided. Even if cases of deliberate manipulation may be relatively in-
frequent,22 there unquestionably are innumerable examples of "eva-
sion by nomenclature." Such instances, made possible by mechanical
application of "control" criteria, are manifestly unfair to workers
who are thereby deprived of various statutory benefits which they
were scheduled to enjoy. Obviously, such situations are contrary to
public policy.
INCONSISTENCIES IN NLRB CRITERIA
We have earlier noted that there has been wide-spread inconsist-
ency in the application of various criteria in the administrative deci-
sions. In Matter of Nu-Car Carriers, Inc., 2 the Board found that
owner-operators were compelled to purchase a tractor under a con-
ditional sales agreement, at the same time entering into a lease agree-
ment with the company under which the tractor would be used with
a trailer supplied by the employer. It was found that all essential
controls were in the hands of the employer. The Board noted the
circumstances which showed that the employer reserved control over
the work of the drivers, and exercised supervision by such means
as the use of patrol cars. Significantly, however, the Board empha-
sized the conclusion that the work performed was inherently the
work of an employee. In fact, the Board actually invoked a true com-
mon law test of employment, when it said:
The transportation of new cars by trailer-trucks constitutes the sole business
of the Respondent and the maintenance of that traffic requires the employ-
ment in one form or another of qualified drivers. To accept the Respondent's
contention that these operators are engaged in individual business enterprises
would require us to consider the Respondent to operate in a manner analogous
22 For an excellent analysis of this problem of statutory evasion, in the trucking
industry, see "Statement of David Previant and Warren Hall, attorneys, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc.," Hearings before the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, United States Senate, on proposed provisions of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act of 1947, Part 3, pp. 1686-1692 (1953); e.g., "So, born out of the desire of
some employers to evade and frustrate national policy, the use of so-called independ-
ent contractors grew and flourished in those industries where they had never existed
before. The highly competitive trucking industry, and those industries which dis-
tributed their products by trucks, were particularly plagued by this development."
Ibid., at 1686.
23 25 L.R.R.M. 1288, 88 N.L.R.B. 75 (1950).
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to a holding company. We do not believe the Respondent to be so divorced
from the actual performance of its business. 24
The Board has frequently held that where persons are not pursuing
a separate and independent calling, and where the work they do is an
integral part of the company's business, the relationship cannot be
classified as one of independent contractorship. 25
And yet, in subsequent decisions where the Board determined that
owner-drivers were independent contractors, the fundamental criterion
emphasized in the Nu-Car case, above quoted, was completely ignored.
In Matter of Oklahoma Trailer Convoy, Inc.,26 and Matter of Malone
Freight Lines, Inc.,27 the Board described the elements of the relation-
ship on the basis of which its determination was made. Although it
pointed to the wide discretion exercised by the drivers in the perform-
ance of their driving activities, it must be noted that, essentially, the
principal point of fact by which it distinguished its holdings in the
latter cases from Nu-Car, was its finding that in Oklahoma and Malone
there was absolute and bona fide ownership of the tractors by the driv-
ers! However, in all of these cases, the essential business operations of
the respective companies were being performed by the drivers. In no
case were the drivers pursuing an independent calling. In all cases,
they were required to devote their full time to performing services
which certainly constituted the very essence of the company's busi-
ness. (This is also largely true of the fact situation in Greyvan Lines,
Inc. v. Harrison.2 ) Although innumerable facts concerning the work
of the drivers were discussed and evaluated in the above decisions, the
above discussion deals with those phases of the cases which the Board
should have considered decisive-at least as decisive as it did in its
Nu-Car decision. The Board reliance on ownership as the vital dis-
tinguishing factor is even in derogation of the control test. There
are many rulings which sustain the proposition that ownership of
24 25 L.R.R.M. 1288, 1289, 88 N.L.R.B. 75, 76 (1950).
25NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167 F. 2d 983 (C.A. 7th, 1948), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948); National Gas Co., 30 L.R.R.M. 1065, 99 N.L.R.B. 273
(1952); Plainfield Courier-News Co., 28 L.R.R.M. 1350, 95 N.L.R.B. 532 (1951); Cen-
tral Packing Co., 28 L.R.R.M. 1276,95 N.L.R.B. 19 (1951); Columbia Reporting Co.,
25 L.R.R.M. 1294, 88 N.L.R.B. 168 (1950). See also, Pittsburg Valve Foundry v. Gal-
lagher, 32 F. 2d 436 (C.A. 6th, 1929); and discussion in subsequent paragraphs herein
concerning basis of Board's findings in the Hearst cases.
26 30 L.R.R.M. 1201, 99 N.L.R.B. 1019 (1952).
27 32 L.R.R.M. 1622, 106 N.L.R.B. No. 176 (decided September 18, 1953).
28 156 F. 2d 412 (C.A. 7th, 1946), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704
(1947).
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tools or vehicles does not convert an employee into an independent
contractor where the employer has reserved the right of control.29 In
this connection, the comment by Previant and Hall is pertinent.80
HORSE POWER V. HORSEPOWER
In the decisions where the Board has stressed "bona fide" ownership
of vehicles as a basis for an independent contractorship finding, it has
ignored true common law criteria. Even more, it has ignored the lead-
ing case of Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn.31 In that case, the Supreme Court
held a sewing machine salesman to be an employee even though he
received no salary and was not actually supervised, although, under his
contract, he agreed to accept "instructions" and to devote his full time
to his job. He was required to furnish his own horse and harness and
to repair the wagon furnished by the company. The salesman, who
owned and supplied the one-horse power locomotion, was designated
as an employee. Generically speaking, the only difference between the
Malone and Singer fact situations is in the amount of the horsepower
locomotion owned and supplied by the employee. The legal patterns
are identical. If the ownership of one-horsepower locomotion does
not convert an employee into an independent contractor, why should
29 E.g., Pittsburg Valve Foundry v. Gallagher, 32 F. 2d 436 (C.A. 6th, 1929); Vaughn
Bros., 28 L.R.R.M. 1052, 94 N.L.R.B. 382 (1951); A. E. Blacklidge, 26 L.R.R.M. 1478,
91 N.L.R.B. 222 (1950); Pehastin Lumber & Box Co., 26 L.R.R.M. 1381, 90 N.L.R.B.
No. 226 (1950). Also note the finding in the Steinberg trappers case, where the Board
said that the fact that "the trappers like many skilled employees who furnish the tools
of their trade, supply their own traps and equipment, does not prevent their acquiring
an employee status." 78 N.L.R.B. 211, 224 (1948).
8 o"In all these delivery situations, both over-the-road and local, the actual transpor-
tation service, which is the primary and basic liability of the employer, is accomplished
by former employees or those who have replaced them. The only real change in the
relationship has been the transfer of the ownership of the vehicle from the employer
to the employee; and in some cases there has been no real transfer of ownership but a
purported one, achieved through lease, rental or other colorable transactions.
"The trucks involved still bear the name and distinctive markings of the employer;
the employees still wear the uniforms required by the employer; the advertising,
public-relations, solicitation of customers and good-will programs, are still those of
the employer. Insofar as the public is concerned, it is still dealing with the employer,
not with a little-business man or independent contractor.
"The owner-driver is still, for all practical purposes, an employee. He is bound to
the employer, by lease or contract, to serve such employer only and no other. He is
subject to the employer's direction at all times. He holds his employment solely at the
whim of the employer. He is not independent in any sense of the term. He cannot
carry on his own business nor hold himself out to the public as an independent, small-
business man. All that actually happened is that he differs from other employees in
only one aspect-he provides his own tools of the trade just as other skilled crafts-
men do." Hearings, Taft-Hartley Revisions, op. cit. supra note 22, at 1688.
83 132 U.S. 518 (1889).
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ownership of 119 or 169 horsepower do so?32 This is one instance in
which social progress requires the application of "horse and buggy"
principles.
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF EXCLUSIONARY POLICY
In cases like Malone, there is no mere abstract legal principle at
stake. Economic tragedy stalks in the wake of the Board decisions. In
that case, one hundred twenty-seven employees engaged in concerted
activities for the purposes of collective bargaining and self-organiza-
tion83 on the assumption that their right to do so was vouchsafed to
them by law. When they went on strike to compel the company to
comply with what they understood to be its statutory obligations, they
were all discharged summarilly. As a result of the Board action their
charges were dismissed and they were left without remedy or forum in
which to seek redress. If the Board's decision stands, they stand help-
less, without recourse. Indeed, if they were to continue to resort to
"self-help" and continue their collective self-organizational activities,
they might well be confronted with further litigation, or even criminal
prosecution under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 4 Or else, they might
experience the fate which recently befell the Teamsters Union in
Matter of Hoosier Petroleum Company.3 In that case the Union en-
gaged in a strike to compel recognition. The Company contended that
the drivers were actually employed by one Floyd, who owned seven
tractors leased by the Company. The Board trial examiner conducted a
hearing and found that, actually, the Company was the real employer
and that Floyd acted as a foreman. The Board reversed the trial exam-
iner, finding that Floyd was an independent contractor and therefore,
the real employer. The Board, thereupon, ruled that the Union picket-
ing of the Company's place of business constituted a secondary boy-
cott, in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. By picketing the
premises of the Company, designated (for the first time, in its decision)
as a "neutral," the Board ruled that the Union was encouraging and
32 The average 2 ton truck develops 185 brake horsepower which is equivalent to
119 regular horsepower. An average tractor-trailer develops 219 brake horsepower
which is equivalent to 165 horsepower.
33 National Labor Relations Act, §§ 7, 8 (a) (1) (3) (5), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amend-
ed, 29 U.S.C.A. S 151 (1947).
34 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A. S 1 (1951); e.g., Hawaiian Tuna Packers v. Inter-
national Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 72 F. Supp. 562 (D.C. Hawaii,
1947).
85 32 L.R.R.M. 1522, 106 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (August 7, 1953).
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inducing the employees of said "neutral" Company to engage in a
strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to per-
form services or to use materials, with the object of forcing or requir-
ing the "neutral" Company to cease doing business with Floyd. Under
the Taft-Hartley Act, the employees are not only prohibited from
further picketing the premises of the Company-they are also subject
to a suit for damages in a federal court under Section 303 (b) of the
Act!
The Malone decision is hardly defensible by any theory of inde-
pendent contractorship-whether the control, the omnibus Restate-
ment, the integrated function, the independent calling, or the eco-
nomic reality (statutory purpose) test. As hereinabove noted the
Board has, in many previous cases, held in favor of "employee" status
despite the circumstances found in the Malone fact situation. Even as
to the ownership of the tractors it could not be said that there was a
substantial capital investment by the alleged entrepreneur under cir-
cumstances which afforded possibility of potential profit, not merely
from service, but from the investment in the equipment. In this con-
nection, it was quite obvious that use of the equipment was strictly
controlled by the Company in innumerable ways. The purchase of a
tractor, although an obviously expensive "tool," merely afforded the
driver an opportunity to earn such money for services rendered as the
Company permitted. The driver could not use his own tractor to haul
merchandise for any higher bidder. He could not even delegate his
work to another person. The trial examiner conceded many elements
of control and restrictions on the activities of the drivers, including
the right to direct the driver to haul a load and the right to discharge
him at will, regardless of his "contract" or "business investment."
Of course, he completely ignored the Nu-Car theory, certainly ap-
plicable here, that the drivers did not pursue an independent calling
because they were engaged in a continuous service operation in the
exclusive service of the Company, carrying on the functions which
constituted the very essence of the employer's business.
IMPACT AND ANALYSIS OF HOUSE COMMITTEE REPORT
Much of the current confusion in this phase of the law can be traced
to the House Committee Report which charged that the National
Labor Relations Board, under the Wagner Act, had gone far afield in
extending the coverage of the Act to groups which Congress had never
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intended to cover.8 In pinpointing its charge, the Committee stated
that in the Hearst case, "the Board expanded the definition of the
term 'employee' beyond anything that it had ever included before,
and the Supreme Court, relying upon the theoretic 'expertness' of the
Board, upheld the Board."87
This congressional pronouncement has certainly created a "climate
of opinion" in which the Board and many courts have been prompted
to rationalize their adjudications in terms of the mythical standards
enunciated in the Congressional Report. Thus, in the illustrative Stein-
berg case, the Board, in 1948, acknowledged that the new legislative
history required that a "conventional meaning" be given to the defini-
tion of "employee," and that "ordinary tests" be used. The Board said,
"Apparently the test thus contemplated is the familiar 'right-of-control
test' which the courts apply in a variety of situations to differentiate
between an employee and an independent contractor. '38 As noted in
earlier paragraphs, the Board, applying the "required" tests, held that
the trappers were employees of the partnership company. In our ear-
lier discussion we observed that the Board stressed its conclusion that
the work performed by the trappers constituted an integral aspect of
the company's operations. Although the Board was strongly motivated
by this finding, its ultimate rationalization was delivered in terms of
the "right-of-control" test. In other words, under the omnibus theory
of the Restatement, this jurisdictional finding constituted one of the
nine indicia of the overall "right-of-control" theory. The Board has
employed this technique in other cases where it has found an employ-
ment relationship. 89 Actually, as we shall see in subsequent pages, it
was not necessary. It may well be that the Board's obvious belief that
it must pay lip service to the "right-of-control" test has prevented its
invocation of the "independent calling" or "integrated function" test
in certain of the cases hereinbefore noted. 0 At any rate, it is to be
observed that the Committee Report does not specify what it means
by conventional tests or ordinary meanings.
8 
"It must be presumed that when Congress passed the Labor Act, it intended words
to have the meanings that they had when Congress passed the Act, not new meanings
that, nine years later, the Labor Board might think up." NLRB, 1 Legislative History
of Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, at 309 (1948).
8 Ibid.
8878 N.L.R.B. 211, 221 (1948).
89 E.g., Nu-Car Carriers, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 75, 76 (1950).
40 See previous discussion of Oklahoma and Malone cases in text above notes 25
and 26 supra.
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However, in evaluating the Committee Report as legislative history,
it is pertinent to ascertain the accuracy of factual allegations on the
basis of which the legislative command is predicated. In this connec-
tion, sober evaluation on the basis "of the record" yields the irrefutable
conclusion that the Committee accusation was unfounded invective.
In the Board's original decision in the Hearst case, 4 it actually em-
phasized the degree of control exercised by the employer over the
manner in which the newsboy employees performed their duties.42
The Board made specific findings of fact to support its conclusion.
Thus, it was found that the publishers actively supervised the selling
activities of the newsboys in many details such as calling, holding
and displaying the newspaper, and the selling spots within allotted ter-
ritory; that the boys were fired, transferred and laid off as disciplinary
measures. Many circumstances found to exist demonstrated that the
newsboys were not free agents in the performance of their con-
tinuing service. The Board specifically cited its earliest decision on
this subject,43 with reference to which it noted:
In cases where the status of an individual was challenged, we have indi-
cated that the statutory definition of the term 'employee' embraces all em-
ployees in the conventional as well as legal sense, except those by express pro-
vision excluded, and that the primary consideration in the determination of the
applicability of the statutory definition is whether effectuation of the de-
clared policy and purposes of the Act comprehend securing to the individual
the rights guaranteed and protection afforded by the Act.44
The Board's definition of "employee" in its early Hearst decision,
therefore, is obviously not an expansion of the definition of the term
"beyond anything that it had ever included before" as charged by the
House Committee. In fact, the Board itself, in 1938, and again in 1941,
invoked the very limitation which the House Committee demanded in
its Report. In view of the record evidence establishing the elements of
control over the details of service, the newsboys were classified as em-
ployees on the basis of the most rigid of "right-of-control" test stand-
ards. In fact, applying these same standards, the Board, between 1935
and 1947, declared in many cases, that would-be employees were ex-
41 Stockholders Publishing Co., 28 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1941).
42
"On the basis of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the companies have
the right to exercise, and do exercise such control and direction, over the manner and
means in which the newsboys perform their selling activities as establishes the relation-
ship of employer and employee for the purposes of the Act." Ibid., at 1023.
43 Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 9 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1938).
44 Stockholders Publishing Co., 28 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1023 (note 23 therein) (1941).
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cluded as independent contractors.4 5 In the Houston Chronicle case, 46
decided on January 7, 1941, two days before the Stockholders case, 47
the Board held that newsboys were independent contractors because
the company exercised no supervision of any kind over their activities
on the street with respect to the manner and methods used in news
vending.
On the other hand, the Board in its early cases,4s ruled in favor of
employee status on the basis of the same standards which it applied in
the Stockholders case.
It is quite clear that the Board's ruling in the Stockholders case was
not "most far reaching" as stated in the Committee Report, and that it
did not import any "new meanings" which Congress did not have in
mind or which the Board thought up nine years after the Act was
passed. In short, it is here stated, without qualification, that there is no
scintilla of accuracy in the Committee's characterization of the Board's
decision in the Stockholders case.
Moreover, when the Supreme Court affirmed the Board in NLRB v.
Hearst,4" the Court's decision did not grant any administrative "carte
blanche" permitting an extension of Board jurisdiction to groups of
persons to which Congress never intended the Act to apply.
The House Committee's condemnation was based upon the assump-
tion that the "economic reality" test invoked by the Supreme Court
constituted a broad, sweeping generalization designed to herd large
groups of individuals into the jurisdiction of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, contrary to allegedly obvious congressional intent. Actu-
ally, the assumption is as far fetched as it is invidious. In its decision,
issued in 1944, the Court stated:
It cannot be taken . . . that the purpose was to include all other persons
who may perform service for another or was to ignore entirely legal classi-
fications made for other purposes. Congress had in mind the narrow technical
legal relation of 'master and servant.' The question comes down to, therefore,
4 E.g., Kelly Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 325 (1941); Paramount Pictures, Inc., 33 N.L.R.B.
447 (1941); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 32 N.L.R.B. 717 (1941); Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co., 28 N.L.R.B. 1043 (1941); Theurer Wagon Works, Inc.,
18 N.L.R.B. 837, 869 (1939); Federal Ice & Storage Co., 18 N.L.R.B. 161, 164, 165
(1939); Crossett Lumber Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 440, 475, 476 (1938).
4 6 28 N.L.R.B. 1043 (1941). 47 28 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1941).
48 E.g., South Bend Fish Corp., 38 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1942); Blount, 37 N.L.R.B. 662
(1941); Yasek, 37 N.L.R.B. 156 (1941); Reichelt, 21 N.L.R.B. 262 (1940); Park Floral
Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 403 (1940); Sun Life Ins. Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 817 (1939); Interstate
Granite Corp., 11 N.L.R.B. 1046 (1939).
49 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
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how much was included in the intermediate region between what is clearly
and unequivocally 'employment,' by any test, and what is clearly an entre-
preneurial enterprise and not employment. 50
Three years later, after the House Committee issued its Report on
April 11, 1947, and after the passage of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act on June 6, 1947, the Supreme Court reiterated its position,
thereby, in effect, rejecting the House Committee's characterization
of its Hearst decision." Once again the Court specifically stated that
there were limitations to be recognized in determining the employer-
employee relationship. As though it were administering a rebuke to
the House Committee, the Court said:
Of course this does not leave Courts free to determine the employer-em-
ployee relationship without regard to the provisions of the Act. The taxpayer
must be an 'employer' and the man who receives wages an 'employee.' There
is no indication that Congress intended to change normal business relation-
ships through which one business organization obtained services of another to
perform a portion of production or distribution.
52
The point here made is that the fundamental guide post to be used in
any administrative or judicial determination is the jurisdictional deter-
mination as to whether the individuals involved in the context of the
existing relationship affected are within the purview of a legislative
intendment. If the people involved, as a matter of economic reality,
belong to a group in our society to whom a congressional act is de-
signed to apply, or if the relationship between the parties and the
factual developments constitute objectives at which the provisions of
such act are aimed, then it should be universally recognized that such
circumstances may not be ignored in the administrative or judicial
process.
50 Ibid., at 124.
51 United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713, 714 (1947), where the Court said that the
application of the Social Security legislation should follow the same rule that it applied
to the National Labor Relations Act in the Hearst case:
"We pointed out that the legal standards to fix responsibility for acts of servants,
employees or agents had not been reduced to such certainty that it could be said
there was 'some simple, uniform and easily applicable test.' The word 'employee,'
we said, was not there used as a word of art, and its content in its context was a
federal problem to be construed 'in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the
end to be attained.' We concluded that, since that end was the elimination of labor
disputes and industrial strife, 'employees' included workers who were such as a
matter of economic reality. The aim of the Act was to remedy the inequality of
bargaining power in controversies over wages, hours, and working conditions." Ibid.,
at 713.
52 Ibid., at 714.
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It is to be emphasized that the "economic reality" test as circum-
scribed by the Supreme Court itself is not actually negated by the
House Committee Report. It must be conceded that what the House
Committee excoriated was its own erroneous characterization of what
the Supreme Court said. Thus viewed, it is submitted that the Board
and the courts need not interpret the House Committee Report as a
legislative command to exclude from the coverage of the National
Labor Relations Act those persons whose economic status marks them
as persons to whom the Act was intended to apply. This is not to say
that the Act should be applied as indiscriminately as the House Com-
mittee erroneously thought it was. On the contrary, a true effectuation
of the legislative purpose requires a truer perspective as to who shall be
treated as employees in our economic system. It needs to be recog-
nized that the interpretational and judicial processes are not to be put
into a legalistic strait-jacket on the mistaken assumption that excesses
were indulged in prior to 1947. Actually, as has been indicated
throughout this article; the reverse has been true. By the application
of the "right-of-control" test in countless situations and with an infi-
nite number of variations, the doctrine of independent contractorship
has been expanded far beyond its original scope in our common law.
The purposes of federal and state social and labor legislation have
been substantially subverted by the use of erroneous "common law"
standards.
ORIGIN OF THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR CONCEPT
Much of the current confusion and conflict in the law of independ-
ent contractorship has developed from an imperfect understanding or
total disregard of the judicial pronouncements which gave birth to the
original concept. Analysis of earlier decisions in American and English
law will furnish basic guide principles which can be effectively in-
voked by contemporary boards and courts in restricting the inde-
pendent contractor to the true position he was originally designed to
occupy in our industrial society. Such result is inevitable despite the
paradox that it is here proposed that original guide principles be
applied to industrial fact situations which the original judicial in-
ventors of the doctrine never contemplated.
The concept of independent contractorship is a modern judicial in-
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vention. It was utterly unknown to the early common law. 53 Although
the independent contractor was not mentioned specifically by name
until the middle of the nineteenth century, it is apparent that the doc-
trine was used a little earlier as a device to ameliorate the rigorous
application of the early common law doctrine of Respondeat Supe-
rior.54 The early judges noted that there were cases in which they
would be required to inflict tort liability on a master for torts com-
mitted by a servant or one hired by him in a situation where the serv-
ant was actually performing a single job of work for a price as part of
his own independent or established business, profession or calling. In
these instances some judges reasoned that the nature of the relation-
ship between the master and person hired by the servant was too
remote to justify the imposition of vicarious liability. In applying the
doctrine of cause and effect, it was observed that liability could only
be premised on the right of control over performance. Because of the
very nature of the relationship, the right of control did not, normally,
exist. However, the absence or waiver of right of control was not
a fact to be proven in establishing one as an independent contractor.
In the foundation cases, the decisive principle applied was that a
person engaged in performing a job in the course of an independent
calling should not be treated as a servant in determining tort liability.
The criteria used in those cases constituted, in fact, a true "economic
reality" test based on the economic facts of the relationship between
the parties involved. Thus, it was on the basis of the role he played
in the economy that it was determined that the person who hired
him could not justly be held accountable for his torts.55
The original revolt against the unlimited application of the doc-
trine of Respondeat Superior, giving rise to the independent con-
tractor concept, was instigated by the adverse reaction of English
and American judges to the decision in Bush v. Steinman.5" In that
53 There is no definition of an independent contractor in a standard law dictionary
published in 1843: Bouvier, A Law Dictionary Adapted to the Constitution of the
United States of America (2d ed., 1843). Justice Holmes in 3 Selected Essays In Anglo-
American Legal History 395 (1909), points out that as late as Blackstone, various
kinds of agents, including factors, were classified as a species of servant.
54 For a history of this doctrine, see Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 Col. L. Rev. 444
(1923), and Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administrative Risk, 38 Yale L. J. 584
(1929). New York Law Revision Commission, Legislative Document No. 65 (1939);
Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Commission, 107 P. 2d 1027 (Utah, 1940).
55 Milligan v. Wedge, 12 A. & E. 737 (K. B., 1840).
56 1 B. & P. 404 (C.P., Ex.Ch., 1799).
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case, the defendant was held responsible for causing a pile of lime
to be placed on a roadway by means of which the plaintiff's carriage
was overturned. The defendant had purchased a house by the side
of the road and had contracted with a surveyor to put it in repair for
a stipulated sum. A carpenter under contract with the surveyor to
perform the job employed a bricklayer under him. The bricklayer, in
turn, contracted with a lime burner to furnish a quantity of lime. The
servant of the lime burner placed the lime on the roadway where
it caused the accident with its resulting injury. The defendant was
held responsible under the doctrine of Respondeat Superior. The
judges remarked that the act which caused the injury complained
of was done for the defendant's benefit and was done by persons
authorized to perform the work for him. One of the concurring
judges frankly stated that he had great difficulty in stating with
accuracy the grounds on which the verdict could be supported.
Several judges dissented. One of the cases cited was Littledale v.
Lord Lonsdale57 where liability was imposed for injury caused by
servants of an agent engaged in working the defendant's colliery.
It was stressed that Lonsdale should be held responsible because the
agent was managing Lonsdale's business. The agent was not pursuing
any independent calling. Although the Bush decision was universally
condemned later, the Lonsdale decision appears never to have been
overruled or even criticized.
During the early days of the nineteenth century some courts
made distinctions as to real and personal property in these negligence
cases. However, the distinctions were ultimately abolished and the
Bush doctrine was effectively repudiated. The evolutionary process
of judicial repudiation is described in the scholarly opinion in Hilliard
v. Richardson.8 There the court cited the early landmark decisions59
on the basis of which it was able to say "Bush v. Steinman is no longer
law in England. If ever a case can be said to have been overruled, in-
directly or directly, by reasoning and by authority, this has been."'60
Milligan v. Wedge6' is illustrative. There it was recognized that a
57 2 H.B1. 267 (C.P., 1793).
58 3 Gray (Mass.) 349 (1855).
59Allen v. Hayward, 7 Q.B. 960 (1845); Rapson v. Cubitt, 9 M.&W. 710 (Ex.,
1842); Milligan v. Wedge, 12 A. & E. 737 (K.B., 1840); Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M.&W.
499 (Ex., 1840); Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B.&C. 547 (K.B., 1826).
60 3 Gray (Mass.) 349, 363 (1855).
61 12 A.&E. 737 (KB., 1840).
ARE "INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS" REALLY INDEPENDENT? 45
drover driving cattle through the streets of London was not a com-
mon law servant because he was performing a special job of work in
the course of his own separate business. It was a business in which
he was licensed to engage. Lord Denman said of the defendant, "The
party has not done the act complained of, but has employed another
who is recognized by the law as exercising a distinct calling.'62 The
exemption was not premised in any manner on the mere absence
of right of control.
In these early cases, it was clearly recognized that one engaged
in an independent calling, trade, occupation or profession is a special-
ist or expert. It was presumed that one who hired such a person
would not normally be expected to exercise supervision over the
performance of the job. That was the inherent circumstance on
which exemption from vicarious liability was premised. The absence
of control was a descriptive qualification justifying the judicial
rationalization. It was a necessary one. The exemption from vicarious
liability afforded in those cases was, of course, in derogation of the
earlier rigid common law liability standards, and was strictly con-
strued. Therefore, if the person hiring an independent contractor
reserved the right of control over the work detail, he would have
destroyed the basis of his exemption. Throughout the developmental
period of the independent contractorship concept in tort cases, it
was never applied in any case except where the services rendered
were in the course of an independent occupation, trade or calling.63
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LAW
When one turns to the early American precedents in the develop-
ment of this phase of the law, it is immediately apparent that the
English doctrine was closely followed here. Although Bouvier's law
dictionary of 1843 did not even contain a definition of an independent
contractor, the cases subsequent to that time clearly established an
exemption from the vicarious liability in tort cases for those who hired
one. As was to be expected, this phase of tort law developed on a case-
by-case basis. Nevertheless, it is a singular fact that no early American
precedent accords tort exemption on the sole basis of the rigbt-of-
control test which has created so much chaos in administrative and
62 Ibid., at 740-41. (Emphasis supplied.)
63 See cases cited note 59 supra; also see note, Hardy v. Sheldon Co., 47 U.S. App. 362
(E.D. Mich., 1897).
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judicial decisions during the last few decades. The only test applied in
our earlier cases as to who is an independent contractor appears to be
the same as that expressed in the English cases. An early standard
American definition is "one who carries on an independent business
and in the line of his business is employed to do a job of work, and, in
doing it, does not act under the direction and control of his employer,
but determines for himself in what manner it shall be done."'0 4 This
definition is cited in landmark text books of American law.6 5
Perhaps the most widely quoted definition is the one contained in
Shearman and Redfield's Standard Work on Negligence, where it was
stated:
Although in a general sense, every person who enters into a contract may
be called a contractor, yet the word, for want of a better one, has come to
be used with special reference to one who, in pursuit of an independent busi-
ness, undertakes to do a specific piece of work for other persons using his
own means and methods without submitting to their control in respect to all
its details. The true test of a 'contractor' would seem to be that he renders
service in the course of an independent occupation, representing the will of
his employer as to the result of his work, and not as to the means by which
it is accomplished. €6
The text book definitions were, of course, derived from the deci-
sions of judges. They are distillations of judicial pronouncements
dating back to the Civil War period when this phase of the law
was evolved. However, examination of the early cases shows no
wide-spread diversity of judicial opinion. In DeForrest v. Wright,6 7
the Michigan Supreme Court held that an employer was not liable
for injury caused by a public licensed drayman hired to haul salt
from a warehouse. In the act of delivering the load, a barrel, through
the carelessness of the drayman, rolled against and injured a man on
the sidewalk. The Court stated that the drayman was exercising a
distinct and independent employment. Linton v. Smith6 was an early
leading case in which stevedores engaged to unload cargo were found
to be independent contractors. The Court observed that "the business
of stevedores is a separate, distinct, well-recognized business in Bos-
64 Keys v. Second Baptist Church, 99 Me. 308, 59 Ad. 446 (1904). (Emphasis
supplied.)
65 Cooley, Torts § 647 (3d ed., 1908); Elliott, Railroads, § 1063 (1899); 16 American
and English Encyclopedia of Law 187 (2d ed., 1891); Black's Law Dictionary 911
(4th ed., 1951); 14 R.C.L. 67 5 2.
66 Shearman and Redfield, Negligence, 395 (6th ed., 1943).
672 Mich. 368 (1852). 688 Gray (Mass.) 147 (1857).
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ton.69 Of interest is the comment by the judge concerning his use of
the word "contractor." "The word is a bad one, but there is no
substitute. '70 Citing Laugher, Quarman, Milligan, Hilliard and De-
Forrest, the court referred to the exception of one "in the exercise
of a distinct and independent employment" as "well known." Similar
applications of this rationale were made in various cases in many
state jurisdictions. 71
An instructive example of a strict common law approach is pro-
vided in Mullich v. Brocker.7 z In that case an employee having no
regular vocation agreed to break in a horse. Although he had some
"amateur" experience, the court said,
We find no countenance for the proposition that a person not especially
qualified for a particular service, but ready to undertake any job which may
be offered to him that he thinks himself able to perform, becomes, when hired
for some job, an independent contractor simply because the employer re-
linquishes control over the work and trusts to the employee's discretion. It
looks like the employee must have a calling in which it is fair to presume he
has developed skill, before he will be regarded otherwise than as a servant.
We do not say he must have a trade or profession, be a skilled mechanic,
doctor or lawyer; but he must hold himself out as having an occupation with
which he is familiar. 73
Some of the cases have also stressed the aspect of the definition re-
ferring to the performance of a single job of work. In such cases the
courts have held that a continuing service relationship is contrary
"to the spirit" of the contractorship concept. Typical cases to this
effect are set forth in the footnote.74
69 Ibid. 70 Ibid., at 148.
71 Murray v. Dwight, 161 N.Y. 301, 55 N.E. 901 (1910) where the court said, "a
servant is one who is employed to render personal services to his employer other-
wise than in the pursuit of an independent calling"; Humpton v. Unterkircher, 97
Iowa 509, 66 N.W. 776 (1896); Zimmerman v. Bauer, 11 Ind. App. 607, 39 N.E. 299
(1894); E. G. Powell v. Construction Co., 88 Tenn. 692, 13 S.W. 691 (1890); Bennett
v. Truebody, 66 Cal. 509,6 Pac. 329 (1885); Pickens v. Doecker, 21 Ohio St. 212 (1871).
72 119 Mo. App. 332, 97 S.W. 549 (1905). 73 97 S.W. 549, 551.
74 Linton v. Smith, 8 Gray (Mass.) 147 (1857); Hale v. Johnson, 80 Ill. 185 (1875);
Rome & D. R. Co. v. Chasteen, 88 Ala. 591, 7 So. 94 (1889); Long v. Moon, 107 Mo.
334, 17 S.W. 810 (1891); Morgan v. Smith, 159 Mass. 570, 33 N.E. 101 (1893); Carlson
v. Stocking, 91 Wis. 432, 60 N.W. 58 (1895); Norfolk & Western Railroad Co. v.
Stevens, 97 Va. 631, 34 S.E. 525 (1899); Engler v. Seattle, 40 Wash. 78, 82 Pac. 136
(1905); Messmer v. Bill & C. Co., 133 Ky. 19, 117 S.W. 346 (1909); Laffery v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 83 Kan. 349, 111 Pac. 498 (1910); Lindquist v. Hodges, 248 Ill. 491, 94
N.E. 94 (1911); Pottarff v. Fidelity Coal Mining Co., 86 Kan. 774 (1912); Alexander
v. R. A. Shuman & Sons Co., 86 Conn. 292, 80 At. 514 (1912); Madix v. Hachgreve
Brewing Co., 154 Wis. 448, 143 N.W. 189 (1913); Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Skeel, 182 Ind.
593, 106 N.E. 365 (1914).
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The independent contractorship test developed in the land mark
American cases was definitive and readily applicable. In applying it,
an independent contractor was an easily identifiable person. In the
pursuit of his profession, trade, business or calling he served the
many who hired him to perform single jobs of work. This availability
for service to the public was the idewtifying characteristic of his status.
The definition which gave him his legal status negated the possi-
bility of its application to one who served in continuous employment
relationship. This was so, particularly where one performed services
which constituted an integral phase of another's business. 75 In a true
independent contractorship the genuine independent businessman's
status of the contractor is, of course, the crucial issue. If the "inde-
pendence" is a mere descriptive phrase and not an economic reality,
then, of course, the independent contractor classification should not
be applied. It should be conceded that the independence characteriz-
ing a true independent contractorship certainly cannot be ascribed to
one exclusively engaged in an integral portion of the day-to-day
operations of another's business. As we have seen, even the National
Labor Relations Board in some of its cases has inferentially acknowl-
edged the inconsistency of ascribing independent contractorship status
to one who was actually an integrated human cog in another's work-
ing machine. Thus, there is a universal juridical and economic validity
in the doctrine which prevents the establishment of independent con-
tractorship status unless the contractor is actually engaged in his
own independent calling, trade or profession in the performance
of specific jobs. "Whose business is it?" was the question originally
asked by the English common law court in the Lonsdale case in 1793.
That question is equally applicable today. It must be remembered
that the later common law decision 76 which was repudiated, and out
of which arose the independent contractor concept, was one in which
liability was imposed where various persons working for the original
employer were engaged in their own respective independent and
separate trades and callings.
75 Poulson v. John Jarvis & Co., 122 L. T. 471 (1919): (Younger, L.J.), Where "work
to. be done by the servant is merely part, a necessarily integral part, of a larger oper-
ation every other section of which is admittedly under the complete control of a par-
ticular employer," then the principle that the servant of another becomes pro bac vice
the servant of the particular employer applies.
76 Bush v. Steinman, I B. & P. 404 (C.P., Ex. Ch., 1799).
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In the "independent calling" test the emphasis on the essential
nature of the occupation itself guaranteed uniformity in adjudication.
Moreover, a further virtue of that postulation was that the status
could not be created by mere subtraction by an employer of his
power to supervise the performance of the work." The very nature
of the definition which gave the contractor an exempt status in tort
law was calculated to apply only to the "genuine article."
CORRUPTION OF LEGAL DOCTRINE
And yet, as we have seen, the doctrine has become corrupted be-
yond recognition in a complex of statutory and current legal contexts.
Speculation as to the cause may be fruitless. However, it seems perti-
nent to observe that the standard text book and judicial definitions
specifying the jurisdictional elements of "independent calling" and
"performance of single work items" also included the further de-
scriptive provision that such contractor does not act under the direc-
tion and control of the employer. It is a credible thesis to presume that
at some point in the development of the law of our time, when social
and labor laws were accumulating on our statute books, social pres-
sures increased correspondingly to escape the numerous social obliga-
tions imposed under such laws. With the meteoric rise in litigation, it
was natural that many attempts were made to exempt individuals and
groups from the operation of such laws. Judges and administrative
boards in many instances were induced to attach new and unprece-
dented significance to the qualifying words of the definition. As a
result, it became increasingly customary, albeit erroneous, to regard
the freedom from control as a necessary condition precedent to the
establishment of the status itself. In this posture, the independent con-
tractorship concept could no longer be applied as uniformly or as
restrictively as was originally intended in the decisions which created
the status.
Under earlier doctrine an independent contractor was universally
accorded such status, on the sole basis of the inherent nature of his
business enterprise. There was a presumption that the very nature of
the status precluded the exercise of control over the work of the inde-
pendent contractor by the man who hired him. It must be remembered
that the independent contractor concept was in derogation of the
77 See court's language in Mullich v. Brocker, in text above note 73 supra.
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common law and strictly construed. Therefore, it was deemed neces-
sary to describe him in his status as one who was not subject to control.
The reason for this is obvious. If, by contract or otherwise, the inde-
pendent contractor relinquished his freedom from control and sub-
jected himself to the supervision of the man who hired him, he would,
of course, thereupon be considered an employee and his master would
be held vicariously liable for his torts. Unfortunately, however, in the
modern development of this phase of the law, many judges and ad-
ministrative boards have misapprehended the reason for the qualifying
descriptive language in the definition. As a result, decisions appeared
in which the absence of control was regarded as a necessary qualifica-
tion for the establishment of the independent contractor status. This
new condition precedent constituted a flagrant perversion of common
law intent in view of the fact that originally, it was not the absence of
control which created an independent contractorship, but rather, the
presence of control which destroyed it.
In order to view current adjudications affecting the law of inde-
pendent contractorship in proper perspective, it is absolutely essential
to recognize that the shift from "independent calling" criteria to
"right-of-control" rationalizations is no mere transfer of emphasis
from one common law test to another; it is nothing less than an
abrogation of the original common law doctrine. The essential evil of
the "right-of-control" test is that it is a corruption of a common law
doctrine originally established to promote social responsibility and that,
as it is being currently applied, is has served only to foster social irre-
sponsibility, statutory evasion and unwarranted penalties.
CONCLUSION: AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION
The description of the "right-of-control" test in action, as here-
inabove described, cannot be characterized as an exaggeration, in
view of the record. It is indeed unfortunate that the invidious con-
sequences resulting from its manifold applications have not been
apparent to those to whom has been delegated the responsibility of
administering the labor and social laws of our generation. It may well
be that one of the causes of the apparently universal official myopia
has been the failure to realize that social and labor legislation fails
in its purpose, unless it is so administered, and interpreted that the
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social "mischief" at which the legislation is aimed, and the remedies
offered, are applied to all of those who are intended to be aided.78
In this connection, it should be regarded as an axiom, that in adminis-
tering such laws legalistic devices to escape statutory obligations
should be discouraged.
The need for a solution of the problem discussed in this article
has been recognized in many quarters. Various remedies have been
proposed. For example, it has been suggested that a new definition
of independent contractorship be submitted to Congress and state
legislatures which will effectuate the "economic reality" test dis-
cussed by the U.S. Supreme Court.79 Others have suggested legis-
lative enactments incorporating the so-called "integral function"
theory.80 The difficulty with suggestions of this kind is obvious. The
problem of procuring legislative amendments modifying the numerous
federal and state laws such as are listed in footnote 1 of this article
presents practical obstacles which at present appear to be difficult
to overcome. Nevertheless, the problem is far from insoluble. It is
here suggested that no vast program of legislative amendment need
be undertaken to extend the benefits of this nation's socio-economic
legislation to all those to whom such legislation should morally,
ethically and legally apply.
A relatively simple solution which promises vast social benefits
deals with the fundamental process of statutory interpretation. We
are confronted with a paradox. It is obvious that the most effective,
available formula for social progress in administering the socio-
economic laws of this nation is a reversion to the common law concept
of independent contractorship, formulated by American and English
jurists a century ago. Their "independent calling" test for inde-
pendent contractorship of the past affords the most effective formula
for the future.
78 "It is true, I think, today in every department of the law that the social value
of a rule has become a test of growing power and importance. This thought is power-
fully driven home to the lawyers of this country in the writings of Dean Pound.
Perhaps the most significant advance in the modem science of law is the change from
the analytical to the functional attitude. The emphasis has changed from the content
of the precept and the existence of the remedy to the effect of the precept in action
and the availability and efficiency of the remedy to attain the ends for which the
precept was devised." Cardozo, The Nature of The Judicial Process, at 73 (1921).
79 See N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); United States v.
Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
80 E.g., see Teple, op. cit. supra note 8, at 178.
